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In today’s rapidly evolving financial markets, risk management offers different techniques in 
order to implement an efficient system against market risk. Probability of default (PD) is an 
essential part of business intelligence and customer relation management systems in the 
financial institutions. Recent studies indicates that underestimating this important component, 
and also the loss given default (LGD), might threaten the stability and smooth running of the 
financial markets. From the perspective of risk management, the result of predictive accuracy 
of the estimated probability of default is more valuable than the standard binary 
classification: credible or non credible clients. The Basle II Accord recognizes the methods of 
reducing credit risk and also PD and LGD as important components of advanced Internal 
Rating Based (IRB) approach. 
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Introduction 
Exposure to financial markets affects 
most of the financial organizations because 
they are involved in the risk business: there 
is either a possibility of loss, or an 
opportunity for gain. Risk can be defined 
as the volatility of unexpected outcomes. 
The risks associated with the banking 
sector differ by the type of service 
rendered and they are classified into five 
types: systematic risk, credit risk, liquidity 
risk, operational risk and legal risk. 
Systematic risk (market risk) is the risk of 
asset value change associated with 
systematic factors. We mention 
accordingly interest rate risk and the 
foreign exchange risk. 
Credit risk arises when counterparties are 
unwilling or unable to fulfil their 
contractual obligations. Of course, there is 
a risk of involuntary default, when the 
borrower may not have enough money to 
pay the loan or strategic default, when the 
borrower may simply refuse to pay up. The 
effect is measured by the cost of replacing 
cash flows. The real risk from credit is the 
deviation of portfolio performance from its 
expected value. 
Liquidity risk has two meanings. There is 
market liquidity when a transaction can not 
be performed at current market prices due 
to insufficient market activity, and also we 
can refer to funding risk, as the inability to 
meet cash flow obligations. In both cases, 
the liquidity risk can be managed by 
setting limits on certain markets, products 
or cash flow gaps as well. 
The liquidity risk is an important 
counterparty variable, beyond credit rating. 
If an obligor has high liquidity, then the 
one-year PD will be lower because 
liquidity is more important in the short 
term. The all-important liquidity risk arises 
from a variety of sources and, if left 
1 
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unchecked, it has the potential to damage a 
firm’s reputation. 
Operational risk is associated with 
potential losses resulting from inadequate 
systems, management failure, faulty 
controls, fraud or human error. 
Legal risks arise when new statutes, tax 
legislation, court opinions and regulations 
can put formerly transactions into 
contention. They include compliance and 
regulatory risks, which concern activities 
that might breach government regulations, 
such as market manipulation, insider 
trading and suitability restrictions. 
The banking industry has long viewed the 
issue of risk management as the need of 
control the risks mentioned above, 
especially the credit risk. Understanding 
the various ways in which lenders 
manipulate and mitigate the default risk is 
the key to explaining some of the main 
features of credit markets. 
Nonetheless, in a performant financial 
system, risk prediction is of great 
importance. This involves analytical 
processes and prediction models whose 
purpose is to use financial statements, 
customer transaction, repayment records 
and so on, in order to predict business 
performance or credit risk and to reduce 
the uncertainty and default. To forecast 
probability of default is a major challenge 
and it needs intense study. 
In the next section, I have in view general 
considerations on default in the credit 
mechanism and several estimation 
methods. Section 3 refers to stress testing 
and stress probability of default. Section 4 
is dedicated to data mining techniques 
which include statistical algorithms for PD 
evaluation and section 5 includes 
conclusions. 
 
 
2. Default estimation and the role of PD 
as key factor 
There is no standard definition of what 
‘default’ means. Regulators and rating 
agencies define default as any of the 
following events: bankruptcy, write-down, 
90 days past due loan or placement on 
internal non-accrual list. The obligor is 
considered defaulted as of the date of any 
of these accounting and financial failures.  
Originally, the Basel Committee suggested 
that, to ensure consistent estimation of 
credit risk across the banking industry and 
provide for data sources concerning default 
statistics, a default be defined as involving 
one or more of four criteria: 
  It is determined that the obligor is 
unlikely to pay its debt obligations 
(principal, interest, or fees) in full. 
  There is a charge-off. 
  The obligor is overdue more than 
90 days on any credit obligation. 
    The obligor has filed for 
bankruptcy or similar protection 
from creditors.   
Subsequently, these four criteria have been 
reduced to only two: more than 90 days 
overdue, and unlikely to pay in full.  
The IRB method, according to Basel II, 
allows the banks to set the capital 
requirements for different exposures, using 
their own estimations for the credit risk 
components. The best estimate of exposure 
to the counterparty will depend on: 
  
  Probability of Default (PD), which 
is the likelihood that a loan will not 
be repayed and fall into default. 
PDs are largely based on credit 
ratings, whether internal to the 
bank or by independent agencies; 
but there are also other factors. 
Liquidity risk and credit risk (and 
therefore PD) correlate. The PD is 
both influenced by and impacts on 
liquidity. 
  Loss Given Default (LGD), which 
is the loss recorded by the bank (as 
a percentage of the exposure value) 
when the debtor is in default. 
  Exposure at Default (EAD), which 
is the amount of money involved in 
the default process. 
  Effective Maturity (M) of the credit 
instrument. 
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Using  their own  methodology  for 
estimating these components of credit risk 
is subject to  approval  by the supervising 
authority,  and in  some  cases,  banks  will 
have to  use  values  provided  by the 
supervisor. 
A bank may use its own values for PD and 
/ or LGD, only if a strict set of regulations 
are accomplished. It  settles  minimum 
requirements  to be fulfilled  in  order to 
implement a  risk  management  system 
based  on  credit  ratings internally 
generated. 
The principle  underlying  these 
requirements  is that the rating and risk 
estimated  systems  and  processes  should 
provide a relevant  assessment  of  the 
counterparty  and  transaction 
characteristics, a significant differentiation 
of  risk and a  reasonably and  consistent 
accuracy of the quantitative  estimates  of 
risk. 
In addition, the systems and processes 
must be consistent with internal use of 
these estimates. 
Basel Committee,  recognizing  the 
differences  between  markets,  rating 
methodologies,  products  and banking 
practices  in various  countries, let at the 
discretion of national supervising 
authorities the development of the 
necessary procedures for  implementation 
of  the internal rating  system. 
 
2.1. The calculation of minimum capital 
requirements  
In the banking system, the main tasks of 
the capital are:  
  Protection of the deponents in the 
event of  bank  insolvency  and 
liquidation; 
  Absorbtion of the unanticipated 
losses  to  maintain trust,  so that 
under the stress conditions,  the 
bank can continue to work; 
  Purchasing of the  buildings and 
equipment for operation; 
  Serving as  a limit  for the  undue 
expansion of assets. 
 
The regulatory capital is associated  to 
minimum capital requirements that banks 
are obliged to held under the regulation of 
surveillance  from the perspective of 
regulatory institution. The aim of the 
capital requirements  is to  ensure the 
stability and  viability of the banking 
system. 
The minimum capital requirements consist 
of three elements: 
1.  The capital definition (unchanged 
towards Basel I Accord).  
2.  The definition of the weighted 
assets towards risk (RWA). 
3.  The ratio between the capital and 
RWA.  
 
The bank must maintain capital equal to at 
least 8% of  its risk-weighted assets. For 
example, if a bank has risk-weighted assets 
of $100 million, it is required to maintain 
capital of at least $8 million. So, the 
minimum capital requirements are 
calculated by multiplying the amount of 
the weighted assets depending on risk and 
the percentage of 8: 
 
Capital =∑(RWA) * 8% 
                                            k                                                               
 
RWA can be calculated based on two 
approaches: standard and internal rating . 
I will focus on the second method because 
it makes the purpose of the article. In this 
case, RWA is based on the four 
components mentioned in the beginning: 
probability of default, loss given default, 
exposure at default and effective maturity. 
For the foundation IRB approach, only PD 
is  calculated  by the bank,  the remaining 
components of risk being provided either 
by  the  Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision or  by  national  supervising 
institution.  In  case of advanced IRB 
approach, all four components of risk are 
calculated by the bank. 
Based on these four keys, for each product, 
RWA is calculated. For a given exposure, 
RWA is as follows: 
 
RWA=12,5 * EAD * K, 
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where K is the minimum capital for an 
exposure unit and it is calculated like: 
 
 
 
where: 
  N() is the loss of the homogeneous 
portfolio with a probability of 
99,9% and LGD of 100%. The loss 
is calculated based on a Merton 
method. 
In the Merton approach to 
modelling credit risk, it is assumed 
that a default happens if the value 
of an obligor’s assets falls short of 
the value of debt. This provides 
financial analysts with the ability to 
forecast future, or implied, credit 
risk using information available at 
the current time. On a firm-by-firm 
basis, this is an important 
component of modern credit risk. 
  LGD[N() – PD] is the unexpected 
loss of the same portfolio. 
  R is the correlation coefficient 
between the assets (loans) for the 
same portfolio. R was estimated by 
the Basel Committee as: 
 
 
 
R represents a decreasing function of PD 
and it has values between 12% and 24% . 
The debtors with a superior financial 
situation have a superior systemic risk 
towards the inferior quality debtors. 
  MF is the maturity function and it 
is: 
 
where: 
b(PD)= [0,11852 – 0,05478*log(PD)]
2 
The MF function was obtained by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
by calibration and it equals 1 for one year 
maturity. 
As shown by Kiefer and Larson (2007), in 
case of bank exposures, the risk weight 
curve is generally a concave function in 
PD (see the graph below). 
 
 
 
Source:  Biases in Default Estimation 
and Capital Allocations under Basel II; 
Kiefer, Larson, 2007 
 
Fig.1. The risk weight function 
 
A calculation of the second derivative 
which is negative, proves the concavity 
and its meaning is explained in the next 
section. 
 
The limits of PD are 0 and 1. The problem 
is often that ratings are not sufficiently 
responsive to changes in economic cycles, 
resulting in a certain overestimation or 
underestimation of likelihood of default 
over different periods. The value of 1 
implies that the lender will recover all 
money in case of default by the 
counterparty, whereas the lender will 
recover nothing with 0. LGD is also bound 
between 0 and 1 and its measurement is 
not linear. 
 
2.2. Estimating probability of default 
through probability of default buckets 
  The evaluation of the debtors is made 
through statistical models on an individual 
basis, by assigning individual PDs and/or 
individual scores. Obligors with similar 
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PDs/scores are then grouped into rating 
classes, or buckets (“PD-buckets”). Under 
Basel II, an IRB bank must assign obligors 
to risk buckets. Credit quality is the main 
principle that states at the basis of each 
bucket and it is defined by a mean value 
and a variance in credit standing. 
The Basel Accord then requires that all 
obligors falling into the same bucket be 
assigned the same “pooled” PD (which can 
be thought as the mean of individual PDs). 
In this case, capital charges are calculated. 
Related to the variance in credit standing, 
which is bound to exist with every pool, all 
banks have an interest in establishing a 
level of confidence at 99.9 per cent. 
Banks with experience in the 
implementation of Basel II rules suggest 
that, to apply the method of PD buckets 
properly, user organizations should 
provide themselves with the means to 
continue drawing a distinction between the 
concepts of: 
- A default probability linked to an 
individual obligor, and 
- The pooled PD assigned to a credit risk 
bucket. 
A PD associated with an individual obligor 
is a metric of the probability that this 
obligor will default during a one-year 
credit assessment. By contrast, the pooled 
PD assigned to a risk bucket is a measure 
of the average value of the PDs of obligors 
in that bucket.  
Related questions have been addressed in 
the literature: 
- How should pooled PDs be derived that 
reflect the PDs of obligors assigned to each 
risk bucket in an accurate manner? 
- How should deviations from the pool’s 
mean value be accounted for and 
presented? 
- How should PD bucket mean values and 
variances in credit risk, among individual 
pool members, be stress tested?  
There is no clear guideline on how this 
pooled PD could or should be stress tested. 
(Dimitris N. Chorafas, 2007) 
 
PD is a continuous variable, taking values 
between 0 and 1, so there are infinitely 
many possible ways to partition the 0-1 
interval into a set of discrete intervals (the 
PD-buckets). The choice of the “optimal” 
buckets (sometimes referred to as “PD 
bucketing”) is rarely reached analytically 
by banks. Most of the times, banks offer a 
defining label of the rating buckets  like 
“very good”or “AAA” and a set of rating 
criteria which help their analysts to sort 
obligors into different classes. 
Therefore, the buckets should be chosen 
carefully, since all obligors falling into a 
given rating class will eventually be 
assigned the same PD. As individual PDs 
within a bucket are expected to be similar, 
but not exactly equal to one another, 
replacing them with a pooled PD obviously 
causes a loss of precision in the rating 
system.  
On the other hand, the buckets must 
contain a high number of observations in 
order to have a precise assessment. 
 
In this case, „the concavity of the risk 
weight curve (see fig. no. 1) means that, if 
two rating classes (having pooled PDs of 
p-k and p+k), containing an equal number 
of obligors, are pooled together into a 
single bucket with an average PD of p, the 
new capital charge C(p) will be more than 
the sum of the capital charges on the two 
separate classes: 
C(p) > ½ C(p-k) + ½ C(p+k) 
Second, the use of pooled PDs instead of 
individual ones could cause opportunistic 
behaviour and adverse selection 
phenomena among a bank’s customers. 
Indeed, if a single rating bucket were to 
include a very wide array of individual 
PDs, all replaced by the same pooled PD 
and treated as equally risky for pricing and 
risk management purposes, then the best 
customers in the bucket would feel they 
can get substantially lower lending rates 
elsewhere, while the worst customers in 
the bucket would stay as they feel their 
credit risk is significantly underpriced. ”(T. 
Krink, 2008) 
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Basel Committee argues that the default 
probability assigned to each debtor 
depends strongly on the type of rating 
methodology and quantification techniques 
being used. There are several important 
approaches for quantifying pooled PDs.   
The significant ones include the historical 
default method, statistical model approach 
and external mapping. 
The actuarial approach or the historical 
default method consists of recording the 
default events over several years assigned 
to the specific bucket. The algorithm is: 
 
DFt  =Dt/Nt    , where  DFt  = default 
frequency; 
                                   Dt   =   n u m b e r  o f  
defaults observed for a bucket over year t; 
                                    Nt  = number of 
debtors assigned to that bucketat the 
beginning of year t. 
 
In order to estimate a default probability 
for each obligor assigned to a bucket, there 
are used predictive statistical methods. 
Therefore, the bucket’s pooled PD is then 
calculated as the median of obligor PD. 
This approach to individually quantifying 
pooled PDs can produce accurate estimates 
of credit exposure, gaining an important 
advantage over the historical default 
alternative. 
Within the external mapping, a bank 
simply establishes a connection between 
its internal rating system and an external 
scale such as that of big rating agencies, 
calculates a pooled PD for each external 
grade using an external reference dataset, 
and then assigns the pooled PD for the 
external grade to its internal grade by 
means of the mapping. Despite its apparent 
simplicity, this approach poses some 
difficult validation challenges for risk 
managers. To validate the accuracy of a 
bank’s pooled PDs, supervisors and risk 
managers must first confirm the accuracy 
of the pooled PDs associated with the 
external rating scale. They must then 
validate the accuracy of the bank’s 
mapping between internal and external 
grades. Quantifying pooled PDs for an 
external rating system poses the same 
estimation problems as quantifying pooled 
PDs for a bank’s internal rating system. If 
a historical default experience approach is 
used, supervisors and risk managers must 
check to ensure that each bucket’s pooled 
PD can be expected to approach its long-
run default frequency over time. If a 
statistical models approach is used, 
supervisors and risk managers must 
validate the reliability of the underlying 
default prediction model. The main benefit 
of quantifying PDs using external ratings is 
that more data are likely to be available for 
calculating long-run default frequencies 
and/or estimating statistical default 
prediction models. 
 
3. Stress testing 
Stress tests are an important risk 
management tool that has been used for a 
number of years now, both by banks as 
part of their internal risk management 
practices and by supervisors to assess the 
resilience of banks and of financial 
systems in general to possible shocks 
(European Central Bank, 2010). 
This method is also called scenario 
analysis and it consists of specific 
scenarios of interest in order to assess 
possible changes in the value of the 
portfolio. 
In my opinion, the key role of the 
stress tests is to draw attention of how 
much capital might be needed to 
absorb losses in case of a financial 
crisis or other shocks and therefore 
increase the banks resistance in 
recession times. 
The importance of these tests is bigger 
in a stable economy because, due to 
the fact that there are no special risks, 
the banks might not be aware of the 
major impact of a financial crisis upon 
their stability. Practically, stress testing 
forces management to consider events 
that they might otherwise ignore. 
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Fig. 2 shows a stressed and unstressed 
probability of default and it is based on the 
study by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision in February 2005. In boom 
times, the stressed probability of default 
acts like a prevention of the unstressed 
probability of default in case of financial 
crisis. This way, it would be much easier to 
determine the value of the collateral that 
should be asked for. 
It is quite obviously that SPDs tend to 
remain relatively stable over a business 
cycle compared with unstressed PDs. 
During economic expansion the unstressed 
PD declines and the obligor receives a 
higher rating; but during economic 
recession the unstressed PD increases, 
closely approximating stressed PD, and the 
obligor receives a lower rating. 
Considering the stress scenarios associated 
with obligor-specific PDs, I believe that 
the economic environment is not sufficient 
in order to offer a pertinent result 
regarding the creditworthiness of the 
debtor. The tests should also contain both 
information relevant to assessing the 
obligor’s ability and willingness to repay 
its debts, and macroeconomic variables 
(interest rate levels, market liquidity, 
inflation rates etc).  
Basel Committee gives the following 
definitions for the classic PD and SPD: 
  An  unstressed PD is an unbiased 
estimate of the likelihood that an 
obligor will default over the next 
year, given all currently available 
information, including static and 
dynamic. 
  A stressed PD (SPD) measures the 
likelihood that an obligor will 
default over the next year, using all 
available information, but assuming 
adverse economic and lender-
specific conditions for the stress 
scenario. 
 
 
Fig 2. Unstressed and stressed probability 
of default, over time (time is expressed in 
years). Macroeconomic variables include a 
growth or downturn in gross domestic 
product, exchange rates and market 
psychology 
Source: based on a study by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 
 
But, the choice of scenarios may be 
affected by the portfolio position itself. For 
instance, one month the portfolio may be 
invested in a national fixed-income 
market; the scenario will then focus on 
interest rate shifts in this market. The 
following month, the portfolio may be 
invested mainly in currencies. If scenarios 
change over time, measures of risk will 
change just because of these changes. 
Also, stress testing does not specify the 
likelihood of worst case scenarios. 
Expected risk should be a function not 
only of the losses but also of the 
probability of such losses to occur. 
 
The stress tests implemented by the banks 
have registered some deficiencies lately. 
The amplitude and the severe current 
financial crisis has determined many 
banking institutions and supervising 
authorities ask if the stress tests used 
before this crisis were quite efficient and 
helped the banking sector to face this real 
challenge. 
The financial crisis showed several lacks in 
the stress tests systems of the banks 
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especially regarding the crisis scenarios 
and the methodologies used for crisis 
simulation.  
In many banks, the stress tests were done 
only for specific activities or risks, without 
being considered an aggregation of results 
on the overall bank. Another issue is that 
most of the risk management methods, 
including stress simulations, use statistic 
data in order to assess the future exposures 
at risk. These data are based on long 
periods of economic stability and are not 
sufficient to identify a crisis. The banks 
underestimated the strong correlation 
between the lack of liquidities on the 
market and the financing pressure. 
Therefore, it is crucial to treat correctly the 
dependencies between different risks and 
integrate them on the overall financial 
group or bank. 
 
4. Data mining techniques used for 
predictive default probability 
In our days, data mining is an 
indispensable tool in decision supporting 
system and it is defined as “the process 
that uses statistical, mathematical, artificial 
intelligence and machine-learning 
techniques to extract and identify useful 
information and subsequently gain 
knowledge from large databases” (Turban, 
Aronson, 2007). Practically, data mining is 
a technique for extracting knowledge from 
information. This analysis process has a 
significant role in probability of default 
estimation, credit scoring, customer 
services, fraud detection and market 
segmentation. 
The most important techniques are: 
discriminant analysis, logistic regression, 
artificial neural networks and K-nearest 
neighbour model. 
 
4.1. Discriminant analysis (DA) 
DA or Fisher’s rule is is a classification 
method that projects n-dimensional data 
onto a line, and performs classification in 
this one dimensional space. The projection 
is chosen so as to maximize the between-
class mean, and minimize the within-class 
variance (R. Khemchandani, 2009). 
In DA, a group of observations are used to 
measure parameter estimates of a 
discriminant function by minimizing the 
group misclassifications. This method is 
used in the decisional situations. For 
instance, DA provides data regarding the 
possibility of a loan application to default. 
 
4.2. Logistic regression (LR) 
A LR model specifies that an appropriate 
function of the fitted probability of the 
event is a linear function of the observed 
values of the available explanatory 
variables. The major advantage of this 
approach is that it can produce a simple 
probabilistic formula of classification. (I-
Chang Yeh, 2009)  
This is a special case of linear regression 
models. 
In logistic regression, there is no definition 
of the coefficient of determination (R
2) 
which is frequently used in the general 
linear model. R
2   has the desired 
interpretability as the proportion of 
variation of the dependent variable, which 
can be explained by the predictor variables 
of a given regression model. 
 
4.3. Artificial neural networks 
Artificial neural networks (ANN) are 
flexible computing frameworks and 
universal approximations that can be 
applied to a wide range of time series 
forecasting problems offering solutions in 
many fields, such as control and pattern 
recognition. ANN use non-linear 
mathematical equations in order to develop 
adequate correlations between input and 
output variables. 
One of the major developments in neural 
networks over the last decade is the model 
combining or ensemble modelling. The 
basic idea of this multi-model approach is 
the use of each component model’s unique 
capability to better capture different 
patterns in the data. Both theoretical and 
empirical findings have suggested that 
combining different models can be an 
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effective way to improve the predictive 
performance of each individual model, 
especially when the models in the 
ensemble are quite different (Baxt, 1992; 
Zhang, 2007). 
 
4.4. K-nearest neighbor model (KNN) 
Nearest-neighbour (NN) techniques are 
non-parametric classification systems 
based on learning by analogy. Given an 
unknown sample, a KNN classifier 
searches the pattern space for the KNN 
that are closest to the unknown sample. 
This means finding out the shortest 
distance. In learning systems, 
generalisation performance is affected by a 
trade-of between the number of training 
examples and the capacity (e.g. the number 
of parameters) of the learning machine. 
The major advantage is that it is not 
required to establish predictive model 
before classification. 
 
Empirical studies in literature outline that 
in the predictive accuracy of probability of 
default, artificial neural networks show the 
best performance based on R
2, regression 
intercept and regression coefficient. 
Therefore, ANN should be employed to 
score clients instead of other data mining 
techniques, such as logistic regression. (I-
Cheng Yeh, 2009). 
 
5. Conclusions 
The management of financial risks has 
many dimensions and involves many types 
of decisions. The importance of this article 
comes from the complex issue of credit 
risk management in order to assure 
financial stability. Credit risk is considered 
the most dangerous category of banking 
risk and in order to prevent it, banks must 
meet a series of regulations.  
Recent studies show that default 
probabilities and average recovery rates 
are negatively correlated (see e.g. Altman 
et al. (2005); Acharya et al. (2007)). Both 
variables also seem to be driven by the 
same common factor that is persistent over 
time and clearly related to the business 
cycle: in recessions or industry downturns, 
default rates are high and recovery rates 
are low. Although the actual researches in 
this area are very elaborated, both in 
Romanian and foreign literature, through 
empirical and theoretical studies for loss 
predicting in case of default or sofisticated 
credit scoring models, at present the 
international financial crisis has revealed 
serious shortcomings and limitations in 
managing credit risk. 
Therefore, I believe a progressive research 
is required in terms of effects generated by 
the current international crisis.  
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